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Defense of an Intoxicated Motorist
Carl H. Miller*
N CONSIDERING PROBLEMS CONNECTED with the defense of an
intoxicated motorist, practicality dictates a careful exami-
nation of the specific situation. The attorney who assumes such
a task must realize immediately that to defend an intoxicated
driver is to subject himself to a certain amount of public
criticism. The ever increasing traffic death toll has resulted in
a focusing of public attention on this specific problem, and
anyone who attempts to tamper with the swift and unerring
administration of justice will feel the wrath of public opinion.
This is primarily due to the laymen's lack of appreciation for
the function of an attorney, that is, to safeguard the constitution-
al rights of his client, and not to cast himself in the role of judge
and jury. However, to deny that drunken driving is responsible
for a goodly portion of our traffic fatalities1 is impossible. De-
fense of a drunk-driving case must be handled by some attorney
in order to preserve the freedoms guaranteed by our Con-
stitution.
Under the Influence of an Intoxicating Liquor
The statutes involved in this situation are quite uniform
throughout the country. Basically, they seek to prohibit the
operation of a motor vehicle by anyone who is so influenced
by an intoxicating liquor as to impair his normal driving
ability.2 The degree of intoxication required to constitute being
"under the influence" varies within certain limitations.
In People v. Weaver3 a New York court held that it was
not sufficient to constitute an intoxicated condition, within its
statute, that the mind of the driver was slightly stimulated or
exhilarated as a result of his drinking of intoxicants. Similarly,
* B.S., Case Institute of Technology; a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 The National Safety Council estimates that at least 20% of all traffic fatali-
ties (approximately 8000/year) are a direct result of the intoxicated driver.
2 The Ohio statute is typical:
4511.19 R. C. Operation of vehicle while intoxicated.-No person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic drugs, or opiates
shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this
state.
3 188 App. Div. 395, 177 N. Y. S. 71 (1919).
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it has been decided 4 by a California court that not any and
every "influence" produced by intoxicants will subject the
operator of a motor vehicle to a penalty. In Steflani v. State5
the mere taking of a drink was held not to place the driver
under the ban of the statute. Conversely though, in People v.
Leiby,6 the court maintained that even though a man can walk
straight, attend to his business, and not give any outward and
visible sign to the casual observer that he is drunk, he is in-
toxicated if he is so under the influence of liquor as not to be
entirely himself, as to be excited, and as not to possess that
clearness of intellect that he would otherwise have.
The Ohio courts have followed the proposition, first stated
in State v. Steel,7 that to be under the influence of alcohol means
that the accused must have consumed some intoxicating beverage
in such quantity as to adversely affect his actions, reactions,
conduct, movements or mental processes, or to so impair his
reaction as to deprive him of normal clearness of intellect and
control.
In view of the Ohio proposition, a rather anomalous situa-
tion has arisen as to what constitutes an intoxicating liquor.
Intoxicating liquor is defined," under the Liquor Control Act,9
as any liquor containing more than 3.2 percent of alcohol by
weight. Beer is defined' ° as any malt beverage containing one
half of one percent or more of alcohol by weight but not more
than 3.2 percent of alcohol by weight. The importance of this
definition becomes clear when we consider the individual who
has been arrested for driving while under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor, who subsequently is able to show that his
condition was solely due to the consumption of "low power" or
"3.2 beer." This exact situation has come before the Ohio
courts on two different occasions and their resulting decisions
stand diametrically opposed.
4 People v. Dingle, 56 Cal. App. 445, 205 P. 705 (1922).
5 45 Ariz. 210, 42 P. 2d 615 (1935); State v. Noble, 119 Ore. 674, 250 P. 833
(1926).
6 346 Ill. App. 550, 105 N. E. 2d 776 (1952).
7 95 Ohio App. 107, 117 N. E. 2d 617 (1952). Approved and followed in
State v. Titak, 144 N. E. 2d 255 (Ohio 1955); and State v. Neff, 104 Ohio
App. 289, 148 N. E. 2d 236 (1957).
8 § 4301.01-Al, Ohio Rev. Code.





In State v. Hale," the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the
definition of "intoxicating liquor" as found in the Liquor Control
Act is restricted to that same act, and has no reference or appli-
cation to any other section of the Ohio Code. A county court,
in State v. Mikola,1 2 however, held that in the section of the
Code providing that no person under the influence of intoxicating
liquor shall operate a motor vehicle, the phrase "intoxicating
liquor" has the same meaning as is given to that phrase in the
Liquor Control Act. Therefore, the court concluded, one intoxi-
cated on 3.2 beer cannot be said to be under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, and consequently cannot be convicted for
violating the drunken driving statute. 13
While the first impression from these two cases leads one to
believe they can be rationalized, due to the hierarchical arrange-
ment of the state judicial system, yet it must be noted that in
the Mikola case the judge relied upon two decisions, one an
appellate court decision 1 4 and the other a state Supreme Court
decision, 5 both of which held that 3.2 beer was not an intoxi-
cating liquor. 16
Operating a Motor Vehicle
Some of the drunken driving statutes specify that the in-
toxicant must be "driving" a motor vehicle, instead of "operat-
ing" a motor vehicle. This has given a narrower meaning to
the statute, and where such a statute is under consideration, it
is generally accepted that the vehicle must actually be in motion'"
before there is a violation of the statute. However, motion of
11 74 Ohio L. Abs. 274, 133 N. E. 2d 104 (1956), appeal dismissed 165 Ohio
St. 104, 140 N. E. 2d 55. Accord: Commonwealth v. Bridges, 285 Mass. 572,
189 N. E. 616 (1934); Drew v. State, 71 Okla. Crim. 415, 112 P. 2d 429
(1941); State v. Parquette, 54 R. I. 283, 172 A. 613 (1934).
12 82 Ohio L. Abs. 517, 163 N. E. 2d 82 (1959).
13 The court stressed the need for legislation to correct this situation and
in indicating its unhappiness left little to the imagination by stating:
Ben Johnson, when told that a particular fact was true because it was
the law is said to have replied, "Then sir, the law is an ass." The de-
cision of this court may well be cited as authority for his observation.
14 Kaufman v. Village of Paulding, 92 Ohio App. 169, 109 N. E. 2d 531
(1951).
15 City of Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N. E. 2d 279 (1939).
16 It is interesting to note that the 104th General Assembly of Ohio took no
legislative action on this problem in the last session.
17 Underwood v. State, 24 Ala. App. 191, 132 S. 606 (1931); Line v. State,
191 Tenn. 380, 234 S. W. 2d 818 (1950); Bradman v. State, 191 Tenn. 626,
235 S. W. 2d 801 (1950).
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only a few feet has been found extensive enough to charge the
intoxicated driver with a violation of the statute.'" The majority
of the states utilize the word "operating" in their respective
statutes. That this term has been considered as all inclusive
can be seen by a quick review of several decisions.
In State v. Webb,19 it was held that starting the motor and
permitting it to idle were sufficient to constitute "operating"
a motor vehicle. The same conclusion has been reached where
the automobile has been towed or pushed with an intoxicated
person behind the steering wheel,'20 or where he merely started
the motor while parked with the front wheels against the curb,
2 1
or manipulated the gear lever of an automobile on a grade so
that it moved several feet through the operation of gravity.
22
In State v. Roberts23 the intoxicated defendant's automobile
was being towed up an icy grade by a tow truck. The only
contact with the road was with the rear wheels, but the defend-
ant's conduct, consisting of running the motor to help the truck
up the grade, was sufficient to constitute a violation of the pro-
hibition against operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The
only element that prevents this from being a "cut and dried"
situation stems from the fact that it is essential that the prosecu-
tion establish that the driver was in an intoxicated condition
while he was operating the vehicle.' 4
In State v. Sanford25 the defendant was found asleep in the
front seat of his car, which was partially in a ditch. When re-
vived, he appeared so intoxicated that he was unable to stand.
The court held that it was a matter of conjecture as to whether
or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor when he operated the automobile. Similarly, in State v.
De Coster26 the intoxicated defendant was found slumped over
the steering wheel of his vehicle, which was stopped on a public
street. The key was in the switch, but the ignition was turned
18 Tenino v. Hyde, 138 Wash. 251, 244 P. 550 (1926); State v. Magdich, 105
W. Va. 585, 143 S. E. 348 (1928); Collins v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 327, 104
S. W. 2d 860 (1937); State v. Hazen, 176 Kan. 594, 272 P. 2d 1117 (1954).
19 202 Iowa 633, 210 N. W. 751 (1926).
20 State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 150 A. 68 (1930).
21 People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 N. Y. S. 288 (1924).
22 Commonwealth v. Clarke, 254 Mass. 566, 150 N. E. 829 (1926).
23 139 Me. 273, 29 A. 2d 457 (1942).
24 State v. Kissinger, 343 Mo. 781, 123 S. W. 2d 81 (1938).
25 118 Vt. 243, 108 A. 2d 516 (1954).




off, and both tires on the right side were flat. Held, that the
defendant was not operating a motor vehicle within the meaning
of the statute.27 The Ohio Court of Appeals in City of Toledo
v. Burks28 held that a person steering a vehicle being towed by
another vehicle was not guilty of driving an automobile without
a license. Whether this case can be applied as analogous to
drunken driving remains to be seen.
In some jurisdictions, the statutes specify that the commis-
sion of the act must take place on a public street or highway
in order to constitute an offense. In such instances, lack of
that element will prove fatal to the prosecution.
29
Prejudicial Argument and Judicial Bias
It is a credit to the American judicial system that there
are so few cases of reversible error due to judicial bias or
prejudicial argument by the prosecution. One of the rare reports
of judicial interest found sufficient to disqualify the judge is in
State v. Muraski,0 where an allegedly intoxicated motorist
narrowly avoided striking the magistrate with his automobile.
Thereupon, the hapless motorist was taken, by the judge and
a police officer, to a doctor for an examination, and then was
returned to the court house, where the judge subscribed to the
police officer's complaint for driving while under the influence,
and the driver was convicted on that charge. The appellate
court reversed on the ground that the judge should not have
presided at the trial because of his "interest" in the case.
It has been held3 ' to be prejudicial error where the judge,
after charging the jury that the defendant had a constitutional
27 See also People v. Kelley, 27 Cal. App. 2d 771, 70 P. 2d 276 (1937) (mov-
ing car off highway after an accident); State v. Sullivan, 146 Me. 381, 82 A.
2d 629 (1951) (starting motor at request of mechanic and then permitting
car to roll a short distance).
28 100 Ohio App. 127, 136 N. E. 2d 150 (1955).
29 Commonwealth v. Paccia, 338 Mass. 4, 153 N. E. 2d 664 (1958); State v.
Swaringen, 249 N. C. 38, 105 S. E. 2d 99 (1958); State v. Anderson, 247
Minn. 469, 78 N. W. 2d 320 (1956); Banks v. State, ____ Okla. Crim . ,
285 P. 2d 455 (1955); Morris v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 648, 280 S. W. 2d 255
(1955); City of Milwaukee v. Richards, 269 Wis. 570, 69 N. W. 2d 445 (1955);*
State v. Michaud, 98 N. H. 356, 100 A. 2d 899 (1953); Chandler v. State, 96
Okla. Crim. 344, 255 P. 2d 299 (1953); Jones v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 15,
229 P. 2d 613 (1951); Rainey v. State, 31 Ala. App. 66, 12 S. 2d 106 (1943);
Snider v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 59, 165 S. W. 2d 904 (1942).
30 6 N. J. Super. 36, 69 A. 2d 745 (1949).
31 City of Columbus v. Mothersbaugh, 104 Ohio App. 180, 147 N. E. 2d 132
(1957).
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right to refuse to give a sample of his blood or urine, commented
to the effect that the courts consistently hand down not guilty
verdicts where people have taken the tests and the alcoholic
content has been below that showing a person to be under the
influence.
The voir dire has, generally speaking, provided little re-
versible error,32 and arguments by the prosecutor also have
provided little. In the later instance, continuous reference to the
killing of little children by drunken drivers, where the fact
situation did not warrant it, was held to constitute error in
Holcomb v. State.33 Seemingly in direct contradiction though,
is State v. Willard,34 where the prosecutor, in his argument to
the jury, made the statement "Don't kill my child." Even though
there was absent any factual setting for the remark, it was said
not to be an abuse of fair debate. An appeal from a driving
while intoxicated conviction, in Wichita v. Hibbs,35 was based
on certain photographs and other papers which were not used
in the prosecution of the case but were left on the counsel table
during trial and argument. The court held, that since objection
was not made during the course of trial, there was no reversible
error.
Sufficiency of the Evidence 36
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence required to
convict one of driving while intoxicated, it might be best to start
with a statement made by the court in People v. Bobczyk3 7:
Medical science recognizes 60 pathological conditions which
produce symptoms similar to those produced by alcohol,
yet the law permits nonexpert lay witnesses to testify to
objective symptoms commonly associated with alcoholic
intoxication on the theory that sobriety or intoxication are
matters of common knowledge.38
32 State v. Miller, 60 Idaho 79, 88 P. 2d 526 (1939); State v. Chealey, 100
Utah 423, 116 P. 2d 377 (1941).
33 239 P. 2d 806 (Okla. Crim. 1952).
34 241 N. C. 259, 84 S. E. 2d 899 (1954).
35 158 Kan. 185, 146 P. 2d 397 (1944). See also Deny v. State, 204 Ind. 21,
182 N. E. 701 (1932) where objection was timely made and a reversal of
conviction was had under similar circumstances.
36 Generally, as to cases where the evidence was held to be insufficient,
see 61 C. J. S. Motor Vehicles § 633 (1960).
37 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N. E. 2d 567 (1951).




The court went on to state that the lack of unanimity 39 in the
medical profession as to whether intoxication can be determined
by a person's breath goes to the weight of the evidence and not
to its admissibility. 40 The pathological conditions discussed in
the Bobczyk case 4 ' are best illustrated in State v. Brisson,
42
where the prosecution based its case on the faulty locomotion
and coordination of the defendant, and the case was reversed
when it was found that the defendant was suffering from
multiple sclerosis. People v. Hellwig43 resulted in a reversal
on the possibility, among other things, that defendant's unsteady
walk was due to an arthritic condition. In People v. Owen44
the court held that where intoxication is claimed to have been
the cause of certain conduct, it is proper to show that the cause
for such conduct was other than intoxication, i.e. insanity or
habitual eccentricity.
The odor of liquor upon the defendant motorist's breath
is generally admissible, but is not alone sufficient to prove intoxi-
cation.45 However, joined with other facts it my well become
relevant. 46 In Naier v. Minidoka County Motor47 evidence of
the odor of alcohol on a defendant's breath one to two and a
half hours after the occurrence in question was admissible, the
fact of remoteness in point of time going to the weight of the
evidence rather than to its admissibility.
The time element becomes important when the prosecution
can show intoxication at some time before or after the time
in question. Generally, if the intoxication that can be shown
was at a point of time after the incident in question, the
prosecutor must be able to show nonaccess to liquor for the
39 In this regard see Haggard, The Alcohol of the Lung Air as an Index of
Alcohol in the Blood, 26 J. of Lab. & Clin. Med. 1527 (1958).
40 See also People v. Knutson, 17 Ill. App. 2d 251, 149 N. E. 2d 461 (1958);
State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P. 2d 893 (1954); McKay v. State, 155 Tex.
Crim. 416, 235 S. W. 2d 173 (1950).
41 Supra, n. 37.
42 119 Vt. 48, 117 A. 2d 255 (1955).
43 22 Misc. 2d 286, 199 N. Y. S. 2d 107 (1960).
44 80 Cal. App. 248, 251 P. 686 (1926).
45 State v. Hainbuch, 74 Ohio App. 193, 57 N. E. 2d 940 (1943). See also
Holder v. State, 100 Ga. App. 215, 110 S. E. 2d 708 (1959); Laughlin v. Rose,
200 Va. 127, 104 S. E. 2d 782 (1958); Rainey v. State, supra, n. 29; People v.
King, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (N. Y. 1941); People v. Fox, 256 App. Div. 578,
10 N. Y. S. 2d 694 (1939); Critzer v. Donovan, 289 Pa. 381, 137 A. 665 (1927).
46 Commonwealth v. Phillips, 169 Pa. Super. 64, 82 A. 2d 587 (1951).
47 61 Idaho 642, 105 P. 2d 1076 (1940).
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intervening period. In Phillips v. State, 4s absence of proof of
nonaccess to liquor proved fatal to the prosecutor's cause.
In State v. Kelley,49 a twelve hour period between the inci-
dent in question and the time of the alleged intoxication was
too remote. In People v. Trantham,50 showing of intoxication
several hours before the accident was excluded as being too
remote in time when the prosecutor failed to show causal con-
nection between such intoxication and the collision.
The time element takes on another role of importance when
it is considered as an element of the propriety of admitting, as
evidence, the results of Intoximeter tests. In Commonwealth
v. Hartman,5 the court maintained that the results of the tests
were improperly admitted where there was evidence that the
alcohol might not have completely entered the defendant's blood-
stream at the time of the arrest, but that subsequent delay in
administering of the test allowed a sufficient passage of time
to permit the complete ingestion of the alcohol into the blood-
stream. Paradoxically though, in Toms v. State,52 the evidence
of a breath test was admitted where it was shown that the acci-
dent in issue occurred about five minutes after the last drink was
taken, and the breath test was not given until about an hour and
a half thereafter.
As a rule it is competent to show the refusal of the de-
fendant to submit to intoxication tests. 53 However, where the
defendant has refused to submit unless his own physician is
present at the examination, and when there is no showing that
the physician is unavailable, the defendant's refusal is a reason-
able one. The refusal to submit to a test, in such a case, does
not raise an inference of guilt, and comment thereon to the jury
is improper. 54 Submission to the test, though, will result in a
waiver of this privilege, 55 and subsequent objection will be to
no avail.
48 25 Ala. App. 286, 145 S. 169 (1932).
49 227 N. C. 62, 40 S. E. 2d 454 (1946).
50 24 Cal. App. 2d 177, 74 P. 2d 851 (1937).
51 47 Berks. 181 (Pa. 1955), reversed 179 Pa. Super. 134, 115 A. 2d 820, re-
versed 383 Pa. 461, 119 A. 2d 211.
52 95 Okla. Crim. 60, 239 P. 2d 812 (1952).
53 City of Columbus v. Waters, 124 N. E. 2d 841 (Ohio 1954); People v.
McGinnis, 123 Cal. App. 2d 945, 267 P. 2d 458 (1953).
54 City of Columbus v. Mullins, 162 Ohio St. 419, 123 N. E. 2d 422 (1954).




An inference of guilt, in People v. Petersen," was not raised
by defendant's failure to state to authorities his claim that some-
one else had been driving at the time of the alleged offense. The
court held that the defendant had no duty to speak when in the
custody of the police, but could subsequently raise the matter
as a defense.
Instructions to the Jury
A classic example of instructions that should not be given
were developed in Commonwealth v. Milligan,57 a bitterly con-
tested action which saw the first trial thrown out due to mis-
conduct on the part of the Commonwealth. In the second trial
a considerable amount of evidence was presented which indicated
that the defendant had not been intoxicated, but the judge told
the jury that if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the defendant, they,
should have no hesitancy whatsoever, as jurors in the grand,
old American system, of bringing in a verdict of guilty.58
The appellate court held that the overemphasis on bringing in
a verdict of guilty resulted in prejudicial error. A charge to
the jury that they might consider personal injury judgments
arising out of the same incident was held to be reversible error
in Hodges v. State.59 A charge, in Bartley v. State,60 that it was
the jury's duty to convict the defendant if it found that he was
under the influence of intoxicating liquors, without a further
charge that the jury must find that the defendant, because of
the intoxicating liquors, was a less safe driver, gave the jury
the "to any extent whatsoever" rule, and was error. Failure to
charge on proximate cause, 61 or on comparison with normal
driving ability,6 2 or in conflict with correct special instructions,
63
or on the error of certain presumptions, 64 have all been held to
56 4 N. Y. 2d 992, 177 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (1958).
57 172 Pa. Super. 607, 94 A. 2d 64 (1953).
58 Id. at 65.
59 92 Okla. Crim. 176, 222 P. 2d 386 (1950).
60 95 Ga. App. 422, 98 S. E. 2d 110 (1957).
61 Espinoza v. People, 349 P. 2d 689 (Colo. 1960).
62 City of Lyndhurst v. Beaumont, 170 N. E. 2d 291 (Ohio 1959).
63 State v. Jennings, 176 N. E. 304 (Ohio App. 1959).
64 City of Toledo v. Gfell, 107 Ohio App. 93, 156 N. E. 2d 752 (1958).
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represent reversible error.65 Error has been found in charging
the jury in matters that do not concern them,6 or in an in-
complete, erroneous and prejudicial manner.67
Conclusion
This examination into the various aspects of defending an
intoxicated driver is by no means complete. Its purpose has
been to indicate the problem areas in which the most care must
be taken in order to insure the constitutional rights of the client.
The great majority of individuals charged with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating
liquor are convicted, and in most cases, rightly so. It is that small
percentage of individuals wrongfully charged, or if rightfully
charged, wrongfully convicted, that concerns the writer.
65 See 61 C. J. S. Motor Vehicles § 634 (1960) for a more comprehensive
coverage of instructions.
66 Megown v. State, 300 P. 2d 673 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
6T Supr a note 63.
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